

IMPLICIT EGOISM IN SENTENCING DECISIONS:
FIRST LETTER NAME EFFECTS WITH RANDOMLY ASSIGNED DEFENDANTS

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Abstract Implicit egoism is thought to cause individuals to create social distance from negatively-valenced targets associated with the self. Implicit egoism is typically measured using name letter effects. Using all 47,371 sentences in New Orleans District Attorney’s office from 1988-1999, I find that judges assign 8% longer sentences to defendants whose first initials match their own. Name letter effects amplify when the first and second letter of the name match, when the entire name matches, when the name letter is rare, and appear for roughly all judges in the sample. The effects are larger for black defendants classified (by police) as “Negro” rather than “Black”. The first initial effect and difference by racial label replicate for the last name. The results highlight the possibility that measuring behavioral bias can help document revealed preference indifference and difference-in-indifference, and that group labels can reduce indifference.

Keywords: Decision analysis, judgement, legal processes, self-esteem, causal analysis

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1 Introduction

According to psychologists, settings where people are closer to indifference among options are more likely to lead to detectable effects outside of behavioral bias outside the lab (Simonsohn 2011b). This implies that documenting behavioral bias in judges helps identify, what economists would call, “revealed preference” indifference. This article tests if judges are swayed by the first initial of a defendant’s name using randomly assigned defendants and if judges are more indifferent to certain groups of defendants.

Studying matching first initials is related to a set of experimental methods (i.e., unit relation) that increase the psychological connection between a decision-maker and something being evaluated (Heider 2013; Emmons 1984). Dating back to Allport (1937), it has been suggested that an individual’s name is one of the most important components of self-identity, and self-esteem has become one of the most researched topics in psychology (Sedikides et al. 2004; Swann Jr et al. 2007). The name letter effect and the endowment effect are said to have the same origins (Kahneman et al. 1990; Beggan 1992; Baumeister and Bushman 2008)—simply being connected to the self is said to affect its value. Belenzon et al. (2017) found that entrepreneurs chose to name firms after themselves and doing so is associated with higher profits, higher return on assets, and fewer ownership changes.

Since Greenwald and Banaji (1995) suggested that the name letter effect could form the basis of an indirect measure of self-esteem, the name letter effect has become one of the most frequently used indirect measure of implicit self-esteem (Stieger et al. 2012, 2014), in part, due to the fact that only the name letter effect and the Implicit Association Test approached acceptable levels of test–retest reliability in psychometric properties of implicit self-esteem measures (Bosson et al. 2000). A large literature examines first initial effects outside the lab (Nuttin 1985, 1987; Pelham et al. 2002, 2003; Anseel and Duyck 2008; Coulter and Grewal 2014; Gallucci 2003; Hodson and Olson 2005; Jones et al. 2004; Chandler et al. 2008). These studies have been criticized for lacking control (Simonsohn 2011a,b; Silberzahn et al. 2014), though Jena et al. (2018) found that police speeding tickets differed for individuals who shared

the police officer's name.

People are extremely reluctant to revise their self-appraisals in a downward direction. Ego threat occurs “when favorable views about oneself are questioned, contradicted, impugned, mocked, challenged or otherwise put in jeopardy” (Baumeister et al. 1996), when one's favorable view of self or public image has been attacked (Baumeister and Campbell 1999). Following threat, individuals aggress against the source of the perceived threat (Bushman and Baumeister 1998). There is evidence that individuals may socially distance themselves from negatively-valenced targets associated with the self (Chandler et al. 2008; Finch and Cialdini 1989). Aggression can be directed against an individual with the same identity as the threatener (e.g., the individual and the threatener are on the same athletic team) (Gaertner and Iuzzini 2005). Individuals seek to distinguish themselves from that person, or to punish for the additional emotional cost that is experienced (Howard and Kerin 2011; Baumeister et al. 1996; Bushman and Baumeister 1998; Boyd and Robinson 2015). Thus, following an insult, they direct anger outward as a way of avoiding a downward revision of the self-concept (Baumeister et al. 1996).

When it comes to sentencing, an initial-match triggers a unit relation, a connection to the judge's self, and the fact that it is connection to criminal activity that is negatively-valenced, which can lead to additional punishment. My approach to studying name letter effects uses each judge as their own control. Because judges may differ in their sentencing tendencies, I look at instances in which judges sentence a defendant whose first initial matches their own and sentences another whose first initial does not. I also account for the type of case, the month, the year, the day, and week of the decision.

I find that judges assign 8% longer sentences when the first initial of their first name matches the defendant's. The effects amplify when the first and second letter match. The second letter is usually a vowel, so this is roughly the first half of the first syllable (phoneme or formant) of the name. The effects appear for roughly all judges in my sample, with roughly 10% displaying no effects and 10% displaying effects of the opposite sign. As replication, I also

investigate the last name. Judges assign 7% longer sentences when the first initial of their last name matches.

The second part of my analysis explores whether some groups differentially bear the brunt of behavioral bias of judges. Conscious processing, directed by reflective thought can inhibit the name letter effect (Koole et al. 2001) and thinking about reasons disrupt name letter effects (Brendl et al. 2005). In contrast, in cases of legal indifference, irrelevant factors can be expected to have greater influence. A judge could be said to have weak preferences, meaning that there was a relatively low cost in departing from the legally optimal outcome.

Accordingly, I investigate whether African-American defendants categorized as “N” as opposed to “B” bear the brunt of name letter effects. “N” can refer to many different racial slurs, but in this article, I use the term “Negro” in text for expositional purposes. A recent analysis of an embedded experiment in the American National Election Study found that labels like “homosexual” as opposed to “gay” (a more inclusive label) affected survey responses on gay and lesbian rights (Smith et al. 2018). I find that first initial effects appear only for defendants categorized as “Negro” and is absent for those categorized as “Black”. This difference in indifference is robust to a rich set of controls for skin color, eye color, and hair color. This finding echoes a recent analysis finding that minority juveniles were particularly likely to bear the brunt of the impact of football game losses on judicial decisions (Eren and Mocan 2016). Lack of reflection or attention can be characterized as revealed preference indifference.

This article advances the literature in that as far as I am aware, no dataset codes individuals as “Negro” separately from “Black” in a high-stakes setting where the labels are presented exogenously to decision-makers and the only dataset of its size and kind with names of both the defendants and the judges and randomly assigned judges.

2 Methods

My data consists of 47,371 judicial rulings, collected from 1988-1999, by the New Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Its prosecuting attorneys are responsible for enforcing state criminal laws to protect and serve the citizens of New Orleans and surrounding areas. In

January 1988, the Orleans Parish District Attorney established and instituted an office-wide computerized system to collect data on every case processed through the office. The data collection system was designed as an internal office management tool. The system collects data about each criminal case that enters the prosecutor's office at every step of the process, and for the purposes of this study, the names of defendants and judges, and the police categorization of race, skin, hair, and eye color.

Once the cases went to the court, they were randomly assigned to a court section by the clerk's office. These court sections are labeled as A through Q in Appendix Fig. A.1. The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court is composed of Sections A through L, as well as Magistrate and Drug Sections. Each of the A through L Sections is composed of a single judge, all of whom were located in the same courthouse on multiple levels. Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 14 governs the allotment of District Court criminal cases in the state (La. Dist. Ct. R. 14.0.). This allotment is random.¹ The rules specific to the Orleans Parish stipulate:

The Clerk will assign daily, randomly, and by allotment among the Sections having felony jurisdiction all felony indictments, bills of information charging felony offenses and appeals from Municipal Court and Traffic Courts and other pleadings shall be allotted among Sections A through L and the Magistrate Section. This allotment shall be conducted by the Clerk and shall be open to the public. The District Attorney shall be notified of the allotment. A computer generated random allotment system be and is hereby implemented by the Clerk's Office for all cases filed with the Clerk of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.²

¹Felony cases must be scheduled randomly to prevent the district attorney from choosing a specific trial judge on the trial day and violating due process requirements. *State v. Simpson*, 551 So. 2d 1303, 1989 La. LEXIS 2677 (La. 1989).

²The use of a computer may be unlikely for the early years of the data collection. La. Dist. Ct. R. 14.0, Appendix 14.0A, available at <http://www.lasc.org/rules/dist.ct/COURTRULESAPPENDIX14.0A.pdf>.

The 1991 version of Orleans Parish's Rule 14 was written as follows: "All cases pending in the criminal district court shall be allotted equally among Sections A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J of the court. Except on Sundays, legal holidays, and legal half-holidays, the allotment of cases shall be made publicly by classes daily at noon by the clerk or a deputy clerk selected by him, in the presence of the district attorney. The fact the accused was committed for trial at a preliminary examination shall not be grounds for the recusation of the trial judge who held the preliminary examination." 1991 La. R.S. 13:1343.

TABLE I
TESTING FOR RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF CASES

| Dependent Variable: Pre-determined characteristics | First Initial Match (First Name) | | First Initial Match (Last Name) | |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|-----------|
| | coef. | (s.e.) | coef. | (s.e.) |
| Judge Male | 0.0146 | (0.0161) | 0.00747 | (0.0227) |
| Judge Republican | 0.0435 | (0.0310) | 0.0276 | (0.0314) |
| Judge Black | 0.0224 | (0.0434) | -0.0253 | (0.0412) |
| Judge Tulane Law School | 0.0224 | (0.0301) | 0.0271 | (0.0407) |
| Judge Southern University Law School | 0.0234 | (0.0277) | -0.00355 | (0.0146) |
| Judge LSU Law School | -0.0779 | (0.0606) | -0.104 | (0.0900) |
| Judge Loyola Law School | 0.0635 | (0.0568) | 0.103 | (0.0624) |
| Judge over 60 | 0.00515 | (0.0642) | 0.0632 | (0.0655) |
| Defendant Male | 0.00696 | (0.0172) | -0.00591 | (0.00890) |
| Defendant has Scar, Mark, or Tatoo | -0.00923 | (0.00946) | 0.0132 | (0.0114) |
| Defendant has Brown Skin | -0.00724 | (0.00876) | 0.0145* | (0.00763) |
| Defendant has Black Hair | -0.0155 | (0.0125) | -0.00349 | (0.0118) |
| Defendant Height in Feet | 0.0270 | (0.0433) | 0.0510* | (0.0291) |
| Defendant Weight | 1.254 | (1.758) | 2.257 | (1.678) |
| Defendant Age | 0.502 | (0.541) | 1.018 | (0.446) |
| Time (Month by Year) | 0.942 | (1.307) | -0.254 | (1.265) |
| Time (Week of Month) | -0.134 | (0.371) | 0.219 | (0.375) |
| Time (Day of Week) | 0.0337 | (0.0248) | 0.00522 | (0.0381) |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

The random assignment occurs through a “bingo” system. When the District Attorney’s office accepts cases, they send the files to the clerk of court. The clerk then constructs an “allotment sheet.” First, the cases are divided into classes based on the seriousness of the crimes charged (Class 1 and Class 2 felonies, along with various classes of misdemeanors). The clerk then matches the available judges to the incoming crimes within a given class. The number of eligible judges for the week’s allotment determines how many marked balls go into the bingo machine. Once a judge has been assigned a case from that class, he or she will not receive another assignment until all the other judges in that week’s allotment have also received one case from that class. Each class of crimes is allotted separately.

I find no change in pre-determined judge or defendant characteristics when the first letter matches (see Tab. I)³. The first letter match rate is 6.4%, which is roughly 1/15 or what one would expect with random shuffling of 15 letters (not all letters are evenly used, see Appendices B and C).

³Appendix Tab. A.1 reports another assessment of random assignment.

3 Results

Results on First Initial of First Name I find that the sentence length is longer for defendants whose first initial matches the judge’s first initial. This pattern is evident on the left in Fig. 1, which graphs the density of log sentence length.⁴ When the first letter of a judge’s and defendant’s name matches, judges reduce the likelihood of assigning sentences of zero length and 1 year and increase their likelihood of assigning larger sentences. The distribution appears roughly log-normal.

To account for the possible role of covariates in the patterns depicted in Fig. 1, I present a multivariate regression with log sentence length as the dependent variable and a judge fixed effect to control for the idiosyncratic tendencies for a judge, month by year fixed effect to control for the tendencies to sentence that change over time, case class fixed effect to control the fact that sentences likely differ by type of case, case class by month by year fixed effect to control for differences in case type over time, alphabetic identity of the letter to control for idiosyncratic differences in sentence length that differ by defendant’s first initial, week fixed effects to control for idiosyncratic differences within month, and day of week fixed effects to control for idiosyncratic differences within week (Tab. II).

⁴It is the exponential logarithm of 1+total sentence in days.

FIGURE 1.— Density (Name Letter Effect)





TABLE II
NAME LETTER EFFECT IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING (FIRST NAME)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| First Letter Match | 0.0851** (0.0399) | 0.0801** (0.0392) | 0.0929** (0.0380) | 0.0858** (0.0374) | 0.0812** (0.0373) | 0.0821** (0.0374) | 0.0820** (0.0374) |
| N | 47371 | 47363 | 47235 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.307 | 0.319 | 0.461 | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.475 | 0.475 |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type x Month x Year FE | | | | X | X | X | X |
| Letter FE | | | | | X | X | X |
| Week of Year FE | | | | | | X | X |
| Day of Week FE | | | | | | | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

The key predictor is an indicator for whether the first initials of the defendant and the judge match, which occurs 6.4% of the time (see Appendix B for frequency distributions of first initials of defendants and judges). When they match, sentence lengths are 8% longer, equivalent to roughly 70 days or 2-3 months longer on average. The coefficient is positively signed and statistically significant, confirming that the pattern in Fig. 1 is robust to controlling for the attributes of the case and the judge. Adding the controls gradually renders a very stable effect, further assuaging concerns of omitted variables.

The results are extremely similar in analyses where I drop outliers (see Tab. III). Results are similar whether sentence lengths are winsorized (outliers replaced by the threshold value) at the 1% or 5% level, or to sentences whose log length is less than 8. In addition, I rerun my basic specification with the first letter of a randomly reassigned name (a natural bootstrap with 200 draws). The true t-statistic lies to the right of all the other simulated t-statistics (see Appendix Fig. D.1).

Results on First Initial of Last Name The results are similar in analyses of first initial matches of the last name, which occurs 6.2% of the time. This pattern is evident on the

TABLE III
NAME LETTER EFFECT ROBUSTNESS TO OUTLIERS (FIRST NAME)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| First Letter Match | 0.0929** (0.0380) | 0.0940** (0.0372) | 0.0888** (0.0373) | 0.0826** (0.0404) |
| N | 47246 | 47246 | 47246 | 44511 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.461 | 0.462 | 0.461 | 0.440 |
| Sample | All | All | All | < 8 |
| Winsorize | None | 1% | 5% | None |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | X | X | X | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

right of Fig. 1. When the first letter of a judge’s and defendant’s last name matches, judges again reduce the likelihood of assigning sentences of zero length and 1 year and increase their likelihood of assigning larger sentences.

Tab. IV reports that sentences are 7% longer for defendants whose first initial of their last name matches the judge’s.⁵ The coefficient is positively signed and statistically significant, and adding controls gradually renders a very stable effect, assuaging concerns of omitted variables. The results are again extremely similar in analyses where I drop outliers, whether sentence lengths are winsorized (outliers replaced by the threshold value) at the 1% or 5% level or restricting to sentences whose log length is less than 8 (see Tab. V).

Results on Name Letter Effects by Judge I next present the name letter effect for each of the judges in the sample, to see if self-identity manifests itself the same way in all judges (see Appendix Fig. B.5 for caseload distribution across judges). Fig. 2 reports all but three judges display significant name letter effects, and nearly all in the same sign. The judges are sorted by caseload, suggesting that experience does not mitigate bias here. It is interesting

⁵Only 0.4% of observations have both the first and last name’s first initials matching between the judge and defendant. 12% of observations have the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matching between the judge and defendant.

TABLE IV
NAME LETTER EFFECT IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING (LAST NAME)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| First Letter of Last Name Match | 0.0706* | 0.0801* | 0.0676* | 0.0659* | 0.0637* | 0.0609* | 0.0614* |
| | (0.0416) | (0.0412) | (0.0342) | (0.0338) | (0.0332) | (0.0324) | (0.0322) |
| N | 47371 | 47363 | 47235 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.307 | 0.319 | 0.461 | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.475 | 0.475 |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type x Month x Year FE | | | | X | X | X | X |
| Letter FE | | | | | X | X | X |
| Week of Year FE | | | | | | X | X |
| Day of Week FE | | | | | | | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).


TABLE V
NAME LETTER EFFECT ROBUSTNESS TO OUTLIERS (LAST NAME)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| First Letter of Last Name Match | 0.0676* | 0.0615* | 0.0620* | 0.0777** |
| | (0.0342) | (0.0336) | (0.0339) | (0.0360) |
| N | 47235 | 47235 | 47235 | 44505 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.461 | 0.461 | 0.460 | 0.440 |
| Sample | All | All | All | < 8 |
| Winsorize | None | 1% | 5% | None |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | X | X | X | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

to note that the judge with the largest point estimate was found to have paid only \$14 per year in property taxes on his home instead of \$2,200.⁶

FIGURE 2.— Judge-Specific Pooled Name Letter Effects



Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level. Specification includes judge fixed effects, month by year fixed effects, and case type fixed effects. Regressor of interest is the judge indicator interacted with an indicator for whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

⁶https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/11/retired_orleans_parish_judge_a.html

TABLE VI
NAME LETTER EFFECT IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING (FIRST AND SECOND LETTER)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| First and Second Letter Match | 0.225*** (0.0668) | 0.223*** (0.0661) | 0.168*** (0.0578) | 0.158** (0.0586) | 0.155*** (0.0565) | 0.154*** (0.0552) | 0.154*** (0.0550) |
| N | 47371 | 47363 | 47235 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.307 | 0.320 | 0.461 | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.475 | 0.475 |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type x Month x Year FE | | | | X | X | X | X |
| Letter FE | | | | | X | X | X |
| Week of Year FE | | | | | | X | X |
| Day of Week FE | | | | | | | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$). First and Second Letter Match means whether the first and second letters of the first name or the first and second letters of the last name matches.

Results on First and Second Letter Match

The theories about first initial effects would seem to imply first and second letter matches (the formant) should amplify name letter effects. Tab. VI shows the effects are larger when the first and second letter of the first name match, which happens 1.7% of the time, or the first and second letter of the last name match, which happens 1.6% of the time.⁷ The coefficient stabilizes with the inclusion of the main controls. Fig. 3 show the corresponding shifts in densities to assuage concerns of outliers.

⁷3.3% of the cases have first and second letter matches of the first name or the last name.

FIGURE 3.— Density (First and Second Name Letter Effects)





TABLE VII
NAME EFFECT IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Full Name Match | 0.191* | 0.185 | 0.206** | 0.194* | 0.183* | 0.180* | 0.181* |
| | (0.112) | (0.112) | (0.0940) | (0.0970) | (0.0958) | (0.0940) | (0.0939) |
| N | 47371 | 47363 | 47235 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.307 | 0.319 | 0.461 | 0.473 | 0.473 | 0.475 | 0.475 |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type x Month x Year FE | | | | X | X | X | X |
| Letter FE | | | | | X | X | X |
| Week of Year FE | | | | | | X | X |
| Day of Week FE | | | | | | | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$). Full Name Match means whether the first or last name matches.

Results on Full Name Match The theories about first initial effects would also seem to imply a full name match should also amplify name letter effects. Tab. VII shows the effects are larger when the first or last name matches, which happens 0.64% of the time. Appendix Tab. D.1 shows that, even excluding sentences with a full name match, the effect of first initial matches hold.


Results on Name Letter Frequency Letter frequency might amplify name letter effects, as uncommon letters might generate more salience when the first initial matches. Tab. VIII shows the effects are larger for rare letters. Fig. 4 shows the corresponding effects for each frequency bin of the first initial to assuage concerns of outliers.

TABLE VIII
NAME LETTER EFFECT BY LETTER FREQUENCY

| | Log of Total Sentence in Days | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| First Letter Match | 0.0759* | 0.0712* | 0.0828** | 0.0776** | 0.0775** | 0.0776** |
| | (0.0398) | (0.0388) | (0.0365) | (0.0367) | (0.0365) | (0.0365) |
| First Letter Match x Rare Letter | 0.269** | 0.262** | 0.297** | 0.240** | 0.249** | 0.249** |
| | (0.102) | (0.105) | (0.113) | (0.0948) | (0.0953) | (0.0954) |
| N | 47371 | 47363 | 47235 | 47190 | 47190 | 47190 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.307 | 0.319 | 0.461 | 0.473 | 0.474 | 0.474 |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | | | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type x Month x Year FE | | | | X | X | X |
| Week of Year FE | | | | | X | X |
| Day of Week FE | | | | | | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$). First Letter Match is a match on the first initial of the first name. Rare Letter is calculated from the 1990 U.S. census of names (at <https://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/dist.male.first> and <https://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/1990surnames/dist.female.first>) and is a dummy indicator for whether the cumulative frequency is less than 2.

FIGURE 4.— First Initial Name Letter Effects by Letter Frequency



Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level. Specification includes judge fixed effects, month by year fixed effects, and case type fixed effects. Regressor of interest is the frequency bin of the judge's first letter interacted with an indicator for whether the first letter of the first name matches. Frequency bins are 0-2, 2-4, 4-5, 5-7, 7-10, 10+. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

TABLE IX
 POOLED NAME LETTER EFFECT BY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION

| | Log of Total Sentence in Days | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| First Letter Match x "N" | 0.174** | 0.168** |
| | (0.0687) | (0.0686) |
| N | 41793 | 40011 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.475 | 0.442 |
| First Letter Match x Judge FE | X | X |
| First Letter Match x Month x Year FE | X | X |
| First Letter Match x Case Type FE | X | X |
| First Letter Match x Skin Color FE | | X |
| First Letter Match x Hair Color FE | | X |
| First Letter Match x Eye Color FE | | X |

Notes: Sample limited to defendants classified as "N" or "B". First Letter Match means whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

Results on Defendant Race Classification Next, I examine heterogeneity. In particular, I can examine whether the increase in sentence lengths is larger for defendants classified as "N" (see Appendix E for frequency distribution of race classifications and over time). Tab. IX reports a pooled regression of name letter effects for defendants classified as "N" vs. "B". The effects are larger for black defendants classified by police as "N".

Tab. X reports the analyses separately by racial classification and finds that a large proportion of the increase in sentence lengths in Tab. II comes from those classified as "N". For these defendants, the sentence length increases by 11% when the first initial of the defendant's name matches the judge's (Column 1). The effect is robust to including fixed effects for skin color, hair color, and eye color (Column 3) (see Appendix E for frequency distributions of skin, hair, and eye color). For those classified as "B", first letter matches insignificantly increase the sentence length by 1% (Column 4).⁸

I replicate the analysis of heterogeneity for the first initial effect of the last name. Tab. XI reports again a large proportion of the increase in sentence lengths comes from those classified

⁸On average, defendants classified as "N" have 22% longer sentence lengths than those classified as "B".

TABLE X
NAME LETTER EFFECT BY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION (FIRST NAME)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| First Letter Match | 0.107** (0.0459) | 0.0349 (0.0951) | 0.106** (0.0455) | 0.0122 (0.0967) |
| N | 31931 | 9863 | 31730 | 8277 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.446 | 0.543 | 0.431 | 0.485 |
| Defendant Sample | Negro | Black | Negro | Black |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | X | X | X | X |
| Skin Color FE | | | X | X |
| Hair Color FE | | | X | X |
| Eye Color FE | | | X | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

as “N”. The point estimates are similar to that of Tab. IV for those classified as “N” (7%), but not for “B” (0.8%). The difference in indifference is also robust to including the rich set of controls for skin, hair, and eye color.

4 General Discussion

I find field evidence of implicit egoism—unconscious associations that individuals have with others who share their first initials. When judges and defendants match on first initials, the sentence imposed is 8% longer on average (two to three months) than when the judges’ and defendants’ first initials do not match. This finding is not due to unobservables that change across cases or over time and affect almost all judges. The effects are found for both first and last names and amplify when the first and second letter match.

The effects appear more salient when a defendant is categorized as “N” than categorized as “B”. This difference in indifference is consistent with some groups bearing the disproportionate burden of behavioral bias in judicial decision-making and consistent with the real-world importance of label changes by minorities attempting to redefine themselves and gain recognition

TABLE XI
NAME LETTER EFFECT BY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION (LAST NAME)

| | <u>Log of Total Sentence in Days</u> | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| First Letter of Last Name Match | 0.0650 (0.0442) | -0.0137 (0.0733) | 0.0675 (0.0454) | 0.00796 (0.0882) |
| N | 31931 | 9863 | 31730 | 8277 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.446 | 0.543 | 0.431 | 0.485 |
| Defendant Sample | Negro | Black | Negro | Black |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | X | X | X | X |
| Skin Color FE | | | X | X |
| Hair Color FE | | | X | X |
| Eye Color FE | | | X | X |

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$).

and respect in a society that has held them to be subordinate and inferior.

Labels play an important role in defining groups—label changes can be seen as attempts by minorities (based on, e.g., disability, race, gender, sexual orientation, or disease status) to redefine themselves and to gain recognition and respect (Smith 1992; Martin 1991). The label “Negro” has been considered offensive because of its association with a long history of slavery, segregation, and discrimination that treated African Americans as second-class citizens, or worse. Since the 1960s, “Black” has been the preferred term.

If decision-makers are more susceptible to behavioral biases when they are more indifferent to their decision, documenting behavioral bias may assist policymakers in detecting judicial indifference. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg identified the New Orleans District Attorney’s office “deliberately indifferent” to the rights of defendants in the Supreme Court case, *Connick v. Thompson*, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). Ginsburg cited testimony from then District Attorney, Connick, that he had stopped reading law books when he took office in 1974. If individuals experience indifference by important decision makers, everyday indifference can be an important contributor to de-legitimization of legal authorities. If individuals experience difference-in-

indifference, it may contribute to disillusionment by certain societal groups.

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A Assessment of Random Assignment

This section presents another check for judicial random assignment by examining correlations between judge leniency (calculated leaving out the current decision) and a collection of defendant traits. The judge leniency (Z_{ijt}) is constructed as follows:

$$Z_{ijt} = \frac{1}{n_{jt} - 1} \left(\sum_{k=1}^{n_{jt}} B_k - B_i \right) - \frac{1}{n_t - 1} \left(\sum_{k=1}^{n_t} B_k - B_i \right)$$


where i denotes an individual case/charge, j denotes the assigned judge, t is the year of observation, n_{jt} is the number of cases seen by a judge in year t , n_t is the number of cases seen by all judges in year t , and B_i is a conviction decision.

APPENDIX TABLE A.1
TESTING RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGES

| | Judicial Leniency | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Defendant Criminal History | -0.00628 (0.00717) | -0.00377 (0.00531) |
| Defendant Age | 0.000168 (0.000110) | 0.000185 (0.000124) |
| Defendant has Black Hair | 0.000691 (0.000618) | -0.000516 (0.000852) |
| Defendant has Brown Skin | 0.00218 (0.00224) | 0.00129 (0.00136) |
| Defendant has Scar, Mark, or Tatoo | 0.00209 (0.00118) | 0.00205 (0.00118) |
| Defendant Height in Feet | -0.00121 (0.000860) | -0.000365 (0.000554) |
| Defendant Male | -0.0000665 (0.000704) | 0.000461 (0.000630) |
| Defendant Weight | 0.0000374 (0.0000198) | 0.0000267* (0.0000132) |
| Defendant White | 0.00139 (0.00130) | 0.00102 (0.00121) |


Notes: Column (1) reports estimates from a single OLS regression of judge leniency on the variables listed and includes case type by month by year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the judge level. Column (2) reports separate OLS regressions of judge leniency on each of the variables listed and includes case type by month by year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the judge level (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).

APPENDIX FIGURE A.1.— NODA Prosecution Flowchart




B Distribution of First Initials of Defendants and Judges


APPENDIX FIGURE B.1.— Distribution of First Initials of Defendants (First Name)




APPENDIX FIGURE B.2.— Distribution of First Initials of Judges (First Name)




APPENDIX FIGURE B.3.— Distribution of First Initials of Defendants (Last Name)



APPENDIX FIGURE B.4.— Distribution of First Initials of Judges (Last Name)



APPENDIX FIGURE B.5.— Distribution of Judges by Caseload



Notes: Original names as presented (commas corrected for in the analysis).

C Distribution of First Initial Matches

APPENDIX TABLE C.1
DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENDANT AND JUDGE FIRST INITIAL MATCHES (FIRST NAME)

| Dfdn | Judge | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Total | |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-----|
| | A | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | L | M | P | R | S | | T |
| A | 9.02 | 13.37 | 7.89 | 2.65 | 12.01 | 3.12 | 0.36 | 1.19 | 14.59 | 7.6 | 3.55 | 9.98 | 6.7 | 5.27 | 2.69 | 100 |
| B | 9.08 | 15 | 8.7 | 2.46 | 10.78 | 3.36 | 0.43 | 0.85 | 15.32 | 6.46 | 4.16 | 9.24 | 6.19 | 5.5 | 2.46 | 100 |
| C | 9.25 | 13.44 | 7.85 | 2.31 | 10.86 | 3.25 | 0.54 | 0.7 | 14.46 | 7.9 | 4.49 | 9.84 | 6.88 | 5.3 | 2.93 | 100 |
| D | 8.48 | 13.71 | 7.81 | 1.54 | 12 | 3 | 0.33 | 1.29 | 14.93 | 6.88 | 4.67 | 9.01 | 7.7 | 5.65 | 2.98 | 100 |
| E | 9.63 | 13.97 | 6.45 | 1.39 | 12.36 | 2.82 | 0.27 | 0.72 | 14.82 | 7.7 | 3.63 | 10.88 | 6.99 | 5.28 | 3.09 | 100 |
| F | 9.89 | 14.44 | 6.68 | 1.34 | 12.97 | 3.88 | 0.53 | 0.4 | 14.44 | 6.82 | 5.08 | 8.56 | 7.75 | 4.81 | 2.41 | 100 |
| G | 8.31 | 14.09 | 7.1 | 1.39 | 11.72 | 3.87 | 0.12 | 0.4 | 14.72 | 7.22 | 5.43 | 11.09 | 6.76 | 4.79 | 3 | 100 |
| H | 9.01 | 15.25 | 7.13 | 1.39 | 11.29 | 3.07 | 0.1 | 0.69 | 16.93 | 5.54 | 3.76 | 8.71 | 8.81 | 6.14 | 2.18 | 100 |
| I | 7.42 | 17.21 | 12.76 | 2.08 | 9.2 | 2.08 | 0.89 | 0.3 | 17.8 | 5.93 | 2.97 | 7.72 | 8.01 | 4.15 | 1.48 | 100 |
| J | 9.64 | 13.95 | 7.08 | 2.58 | 12.18 | 3.34 | 0.34 | 1.16 | 14.61 | 6.86 | 3.7 | 8.96 | 7.26 | 5.56 | 2.76 | 100 |
| K | 9.67 | 15.68 | 8.23 | 2.22 | 9.81 | 3.97 | 0.14 | 0.6 | 15.86 | 6.65 | 3.73 | 9.25 | 6.05 | 5.38 | 2.78 | 100 |
| L | 9.17 | 13.97 | 7.95 | 2.46 | 10.58 | 2.73 | 0.16 | 0.79 | 15.28 | 9.1 | 3.75 | 8.54 | 7.26 | 5.26 | 2.99 | 100 |
| M | 9.14 | 13.62 | 7.51 | 2.38 | 10.92 | 3.26 | 0.47 | 0.75 | 15.15 | 8.11 | 3.66 | 9.08 | 7.79 | 4.85 | 3.32 | 100 |
| N | 8.46 | 14.58 | 5.47 | 2.08 | 16.67 | 3.78 | 0.65 | 2.34 | 13.67 | 7.16 | 3.78 | 8.07 | 6.12 | 4.95 | 2.21 | 100 |
| O | 8.95 | 15.34 | 10.22 | 1.92 | 10.86 | 2.88 | 0 | 0.96 | 15.65 | 6.71 | 3.19 | 8.31 | 6.71 | 3.83 | 4.47 | 100 |
| P | 8.02 | 14.06 | 10 | 0.99 | 14.95 | 2.57 | 0.2 | 0.59 | 12.57 | 7.92 | 3.37 | 9.31 | 6.53 | 4.06 | 4.85 | 100 |
| Q | 9.3 | 19.19 | 10.47 | 5.23 | 5.23 | 5.23 | 0 | 0.58 | 12.21 | 4.65 | 1.74 | 8.72 | 6.98 | 8.14 | 2.33 | 100 |
| R | 8.21 | 12.92 | 8.41 | 1.6 | 11.24 | 3.21 | 0.45 | 1.18 | 15.4 | 8.49 | 3.58 | 9.92 | 7.51 | 5.33 | 2.53 | 100 |
| S | 9.12 | 15.36 | 5.41 | 1.75 | 12.53 | 2.91 | 0.37 | 0.62 | 17.94 | 6.58 | 4.2 | 8.2 | 6.95 | 5.12 | 2.91 | 100 |
| T | 9.92 | 15.18 | 6.69 | 1.87 | 10.3 | 4.15 | 0.25 | 1.14 | 14.16 | 7.54 | 3.49 | 10.52 | 6.56 | 5.35 | 2.88 | 100 |
| U | 4.26 | 25.53 | 12.77 | 0 | 8.51 | 2.13 | 0 | 0 | 25.53 | 4.26 | 4.26 | 4.26 | 4.26 | 2.13 | 2.13 | 100 |
| V | 7.36 | 15.31 | 8.75 | 0.6 | 12.52 | 2.98 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 17.69 | 6.36 | 4.17 | 7.55 | 7.16 | 4.17 | 4.37 | 100 |
| W | 8.04 | 12.75 | 7.19 | 1.31 | 12.62 | 3.92 | 0.52 | 1.11 | 14.65 | 8.31 | 5.17 | 9.16 | 8.11 | 4.97 | 2.16 | 100 |
| X | 16.67 | 0 | 33.33 | 0 | 8.33 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16.67 | 0 | 16.67 | 0 | 8.33 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Y | 7.56 | 13.45 | 10.08 | 1.68 | 15.97 | 1.68 | 0 | 0.84 | 20.17 | 8.4 | 4.2 | 9.24 | 2.52 | 2.52 | 1.68 | 100 |
| Z | 6.42 | 14.68 | 9.17 | 4.59 | 10.09 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0 | 15.6 | 13.76 | 1.83 | 12.84 | 2.75 | 3.67 | 2.75 | 100 |
| Total | 9.02 | 14.13 | 7.6 | 2 | 11.56 | 3.29 | 0.35 | 0.93 | 15.1 | 7.45 | 3.98 | 9.38 | 7.09 | 5.25 | 2.86 | 100 |

APPENDIX TABLE C.2
DISTRIBUTION OF DEFENDANT AND JUDGE FIRST INITIAL MATCHES (LAST NAME)

| Dfdn | Judge | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Total | |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| | A | B | C | D | E | G | H | J | K | L | M | O | P | Q | R | S | | W |
| A | 2.44 | 9.64 | 5.86 | 0 | 3.23 | 6.53 | 9.03 | 6.71 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 16.6 | 0 | 3.9 | 10.07 | 5.25 | 6.22 | 10.62 | 100 |
| B | 3.26 | 8.03 | 5.72 | 0 | 3.35 | 5.59 | 9.63 | 8.4 | 1.81 | 2.27 | 17.3 | 0 | 3.26 | 8.13 | 6.2 | 5.74 | 11.31 | 100 |
| C | 2.89 | 8.47 | 5.81 | 0 | 3.6 | 6.99 | 9.85 | 7.88 | 1.5 | 1.77 | 17.43 | 0 | 3.13 | 9.65 | 4.93 | 5.1 | 11 | 100 |
| D | 2.28 | 7.18 | 5.77 | 0 | 3.65 | 5.81 | 9.65 | 6.95 | 2.2 | 2.71 | 19.47 | 0 | 3.65 | 9.46 | 5.22 | 4.24 | 11.77 | 100 |
| E | 2.82 | 8.47 | 4.44 | 0 | 3.9 | 8.2 | 10.89 | 5.78 | 2.69 | 2.15 | 16.26 | 0 | 4.03 | 9.41 | 5.24 | 5.38 | 10.35 | 100 |
| F | 3.4 | 9.33 | 4.41 | 0 | 2.97 | 7.31 | 10.42 | 7.24 | 1.45 | 1.81 | 15.63 | 0 | 2.6 | 10.56 | 5.57 | 5.93 | 11.36 | 100 |
| G | 3.4 | 10.85 | 4.92 | 0 | 3.09 | 5.42 | 10.24 | 8.16 | 1.37 | 1.88 | 14.09 | 0 | 2.94 | 9.93 | 6.34 | 6.08 | 11.3 | 100 |
| H | 3 | 10.27 | 6.43 | 0 | 3.06 | 6.1 | 9.64 | 7.24 | 1.53 | 2.58 | 17.39 | 0 | 3.09 | 8.92 | 5.11 | 5.53 | 10.09 | 100 |
| I | 3.09 | 8.25 | 3.09 | 0 | 3.09 | 5.15 | 9.28 | 9.28 | 1.03 | 0 | 18.56 | 0 | 9.28 | 6.19 | 7.22 | 4.12 | 12.37 | 100 |
| J | 2.35 | 7.95 | 5.21 | 0 | 4.6 | 6.23 | 10.22 | 6.93 | 1.55 | 2.66 | 16.59 | 0 | 3.88 | 10.91 | 4.43 | 4.74 | 11.75 | 100 |
| K | 3.19 | 6.12 | 6.12 | 0 | 2.39 | 6.38 | 8.11 | 7.45 | 0.93 | 2.39 | 17.02 | 0 | 3.59 | 8.24 | 6.78 | 5.98 | 15.29 | 100 |
| L | 3.11 | 8.2 | 4.83 | 0 | 4.71 | 6.43 | 8.91 | 7.9 | 1.51 | 2.61 | 15.68 | 0 | 3.83 | 9.84 | 6.09 | 5.84 | 10.51 | 100 |
| M | 2.86 | 8.88 | 6.17 | 0 | 3.36 | 7.43 | 9.03 | 6.85 | 1.88 | 2.21 | 16.44 | 0 | 2.76 | 9.26 | 5.85 | 4.72 | 12.3 | 100 |
| N | 1.62 | 8.98 | 6.04 | 0 | 2.95 | 7.51 | 5.74 | 8.1 | 1.91 | 2.95 | 14.87 | 0 | 3.09 | 12.52 | 5.89 | 6.92 | 10.9 | 100 |
| O | 2.26 | 4.52 | 3.23 | 0 | 8.71 | 7.1 | 5.81 | 11.61 | 0.97 | 2.9 | 16.77 | 0 | 4.19 | 8.06 | 5.48 | 5.48 | 12.9 | 100 |
| P | 3.37 | 8.03 | 5.4 | 0 | 2.49 | 6.41 | 9.27 | 8.03 | 1.98 | 2.44 | 16.84 | 0 | 3.32 | 10.98 | 5.81 | 5.4 | 10.24 | 100 |
| Q | 5.06 | 12.66 | 11.39 | 0 | 1.27 | 1.27 | 3.8 | 5.06 | 0 | 0 | 12.66 | 0 | 7.59 | 6.33 | 5.06 | 6.33 | 21.52 | 100 |
| R | 2.75 | 9.4 | 4.74 | 0 | 3.35 | 6.85 | 8.88 | 7.45 | 1.99 | 2.07 | 17.17 | 0.04 | 3.43 | 9.2 | 5.1 | 4.74 | 12.83 | 100 |
| S | 3.23 | 8.29 | 4.77 | 0.03 | 3.02 | 5.98 | 9 | 7.92 | 1.71 | 2.39 | 18.76 | 0 | 3.62 | 9.13 | 4.98 | 5.01 | 12.17 | 100 |
| T | 2.93 | 6.36 | 7.05 | 0 | 2.15 | 7.55 | 10.53 | 8.24 | 1.74 | 2.24 | 15.01 | 0 | 3.16 | 9.84 | 5.54 | 5.58 | 12.08 | 100 |
| U | 2.33 | 6.98 | 6.98 | 0 | 0 | 2.33 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 0 | 4.65 | 9.3 | 0 | 2.33 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 13.95 | 13.95 | 100 |
| V | 1.82 | 13.86 | 5.91 | 0 | 5 | 5.23 | 10 | 5 | 1.59 | 1.14 | 17.5 | 0 | 2.95 | 7.05 | 6.14 | 5.91 | 10.91 | 100 |
| W | 2.42 | 8.23 | 5.26 | 0 | 3.31 | 6.58 | 10.11 | 7.08 | 1.82 | 2.33 | 18.24 | 0 | 2.69 | 8.07 | 6.22 | 5.47 | 12.17 | 100 |
| X | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 100 |
| Y | 1.92 | 10.77 | 4.62 | 0 | 2.69 | 6.54 | 10.38 | 8.46 | 1.54 | 1.15 | 16.92 | 0 | 1.15 | 9.23 | 5.38 | 5.77 | 13.46 | 100 |
| Z | 3.57 | 7.14 | 2.38 | 0 | 3.57 | 9.52 | 8.33 | 5.95 | 2.38 | 3.57 | 15.48 | 0 | 5.95 | 7.14 | 10.71 | 1.19 | 13.1 | 100 |
| Total | 2.86 | 8.53 | 5.51 | 0 | 3.4 | 6.46 | 9.52 | 7.53 | 1.73 | 2.28 | 17.01 | 0 | 3.3 | 9.38 | 5.55 | 5.33 | 11.58 | 100 |


D Additional Baseline Results

APPENDIX TABLE D.1
NAME LETTER EFFECT IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING (EXCLUDING FULL NAME MATCH)

| | Log of Total Sentence in Days | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| First Letter Match | 0.0816** (0.0332) | 0.0847** (0.0332) | 0.0825*** (0.0290) | 0.0786** (0.0294) | 0.0756** (0.0304) | 0.0747** (0.0303) | 0.0749** (0.0305) |
| N | 47068 | 47060 | 46932 | 46887 | 46887 | 46887 | 46887 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.307 | 0.320 | 0.461 | 0.473 | 0.474 | 0.475 | 0.475 |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type x Month x Year FE | | | | X | X | X | X |
| Letter FE | | | | | X | X | X |
| Week of Year FE | | | | | | X | X |
| Day of Week FE | | | | | | | X |


Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$). First Letter Match means whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches.

APPENDIX FIGURE D.1.— Randomization Inference with Randomly Reassigned Names




E Distribution of Defendant Race, Skin, Eye, and Hair Classifications

APPENDIX FIGURE E.1.— Distribution of Skin Color Classification




Notes: Original data as presented.

APPENDIX FIGURE E.2.— Distribution of Hair Color Classification




Notes: Original data as presented.

APPENDIX FIGURE E.3.— Distribution of Eye Color Classification




Notes: Original data as presented.

APPENDIX FIGURE E.4.— Distribution of Race Classification



Notes: Original data as presented.

APPENDIX FIGURE E.5.— Distribution of “N” Classification Over Time



Notes: Original data as presented.

F Additional Racial Classification Results

I present analysis by judge's race. White judges have slightly larger name letter effects for white defendants (Appendix Tab. F.1 Column 3) than for non-white defendants (Appendix Tab. F.1 Column 4), but the effect for non-white defendants is more precisely estimated.

Appendix Tab. F.2 examines difference in indifference to "N" vs. "B" and reports that labels affect both black judges (Column 1) and white judges (Column 3), but the effect is larger for black judges. The sample is restricted to defendants who are white or black.⁹ The effect is robust to the rich set of controls for skin color, hair color, and eye color, fully interacted with first letter match.

⁹All the judges are white or black.

APPENDIX TABLE F.1
 POOLED NAME LETTER EFFECT BY JUDGE AND DEFENDANT RACE

| | Log of Total Sentence in Days | | | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| First Letter Match | 0.113** (0.0480) | 0.162 (0.212) | 0.0726* (0.0360) | 0.115 (0.0806) |
| N | 11953 | 1363 | 29837 | 3649 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.464 | 0.513 | 0.479 | 0.439 |
| Judge Sample | Black | Black | White | White |
| Defendant Sample | Not White | White | Not White | White |
| Judge FE | X | X | X | X |
| Month x Year FE | X | X | X | X |
| Case Type FE | X | X | X | X |

Notes: Sample limited to defendants classified as “N”, “B”, or “W”. First Letter Match means whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).

APPENDIX TABLE F.2
 POOLED NAME LETTER EFFECT BY RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND JUDGE RACE

| | Log of Total Sentence in Days | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| First Letter Match x “N” | 0.420** (0.171) | 0.410** (0.153) | 0.110 (0.0656) | 0.110 (0.0732) |
| N | 11945 | 11480 | 29824 | 28511 |
| adj. R-sq | 0.471 | 0.438 | 0.483 | 0.452 |
| Judge Sample | Black | Black | White | White |
| First Letter Match x Judge FE | X | X | X | X |
| First Letter Match x Month x Year FE | X | X | X | X |
| First Letter Match x Case Type FE | X | X | X | X |
| First Letter Match x Skin Color FE | | X | | X |
| First Letter Match x Hair Color FE | | X | | X |
| First Letter Match x Eye Color FE | | X | | X |

Notes: Sample limited to defendants classified as “N” or “B”. First Letter Match means whether the first letter of the first name or the first letter of the last name matches. Robust standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses (* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01).