Simon Mongey

Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics
University of Chicago
1126 E. 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 347/208-2481

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NBER Program Affiliations: EFG
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow
Institutional Affiliation: University of Chicago

NBER Working Papers and Publications

September 2019Macro Recruiting Intensity from Micro Data
with Giovanni L. Violante: w26231
We merge QCEW and JOLTS microdata to study the recruiting intensity of firms in the cross-section and over time. Vast establishment-level heterogeneity in vacancy filling rates is entirely explained by differences in gross hiring rates. Through the lens of standard theory, we aggregate firm-level decisions into an measure of aggregate recruiting intensity (ARI). Procyclicality of ARI is primarily due to cutting recruiting effort in slack labor markets. Given this we provide an ARI index easily computable from publicly available macroeconomic data. Declining ARI in the Great Recession accounted for much of the increase in unemployment, but little of its persistence.
May 2019Assets and Job Choice: Student Debt, Wages and Amenities
with Mi Luo: w25801
If consumption and non-wage amenities of work enter utility, holding few assets may induce a trade-off between wages and amenities when searching for a job. We establish this in a model of search with asset accumulation, extended to accommodate amenities. We then provide empirical evidence of this trade-off in the context of student debt, finding that higher debt causes graduates to accept jobs with higher wages and lower job satisfaction. In a representative sample of college graduates, we infer causality by exploiting within-college, across cohort changes in financial aid. A quantitative extension of our theoretical framework that explicitly models student debt accounts well for our empirical results. Identifying the utility value of amenities through observed search behavior, we find th...
March 2019Labor Market Power
with David W. Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff: w25719
What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this question in two steps: (1) we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market, (2) we estimate key parameters using within-firm-state, across-market differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S. Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage pass-through, and new measurements of the distribution of local market concentration. The model implies welfare losses from labor market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages ca...
September 2016Aggregate Recruiting Intensity
with Alessandro Gavazza, Giovanni L. Violante: w22677
We develop a model of firm dynamics with random search in the labor market where hiring firms exert recruiting effort by spending resources to fill vacancies faster. Consistent with micro evidence, in the model fast-growing firms invest more in recruiting activities and achieve higher job-filling rates. In equilibrium, individual decisions of hiring firms aggregate into an index of economy-wide recruiting intensity. We use the model to study how aggregate shocks transmit to recruiting intensity, andwhether this channel can account for the dynamics of aggregate matching efficiency around the Great Recession. Productivity and financial shocks lead to sizable pro-cyclical fluctuations inmatching efficiency through recruiting effort. Quantitatively, the main mechanism is that firms attain thei...

Published: Alessandro Gavazza & Simon Mongey & Giovanni L. Violante, 2018. "Aggregate Recruiting Intensity," American Economic Review, vol 108(8), pages 2088-2127. citation courtesy of

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