Stanford Graduate School of Business
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Institutional Affiliation: Stanford University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|June 2020||Socioeconomic Network Heterogeneity and Pandemic Policy Response|
with , , , , , , , : w27374
We develop a heterogeneous-agents network-based model to analyze alternative policies during a pandemic outbreak, accounting for health and economic trade-offs within the same empirical framework. We leverage a variety of data sources, including data on individuals' mobility and encounters across metropolitan areas, health records, and measures of the possibility to be productively working from home. This combination of data sources allows us to build a framework in which the severity of a disease outbreak varies across locations and industries, and across individuals who differ by age, occupation, and preexisting health conditions.
We use this framework to analyze the impact of different social distancing policies in the context of the COVID-19 outbreaks across US metropolitan areas. Our...
|May 2020||Comment on "Procurement Choices and Infrastructure Costs"|
in Economic Analysis and Infrastructure Investment, Edward L. Glaeser and James M. Poterba, editors
|December 2019||Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing|
with , : w26592
A concern central to the economics of privacy is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common response is that consumers should have control over their data and the ability to choose how firms access it. Since firms draw inferences based on both the data seen as well as the consumer’s disclosure choices, the strategic implications of this proposal are unclear. We investigate whether such measures improve consumer welfare in monopolistic and competitive environments. We find that consumer control can guarantee gains for every consumer type relative to both perfect price discrimination and no personalized pricing. This result is driven by two ideas. First, consumers can use disclosure to amplify competition between firms. Second, consumers can share information that induc...