Laura A. Schechter
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics
University of Wisconsin, Madison
427 Lorch St.
334 Taylor Hall
Institutional Affiliation: University of Wisconsin, Madison
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2018||Government Decentralization Under Changing State Capacity: Experimental Evidence From Paraguay|
with Ernesto Dal Bó, Frederico Finan, Nicholas Y. Li: w24879
Standard models of hierarchy assume that agents and middle managers are better informed than principals about how to implement a particular task. We estimate the value of the informational advantage held by supervisors (middle managers) when ministerial leadership (the principal) introduced a new monitoring technology aimed at improving the performance of agricultural extension agents (AEAs) in rural Paraguay. Our approach employs a novel experimental design that, before randomization of treatment, elicited from supervisors which AEAs they believed should be prioritized for treatment. We find that supervisors did have valuable information—they prioritized AEAs who would be more responsive to the monitoring treatment. We develop a model of monitoring under different allocation rules and ro...
|September 2011||Vote-Buying and Reciprocity|
with Frederico Finan: w17411
While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.
Published: Frederico Finan & Laura Schechter, 2012. "Vote‐Buying and Reciprocity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(2), pages 863-881, 03. citation courtesy of