Department of Economics
1805 Cambridge St.
Cambridge, MA 02138
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2014||What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics|
with Raj Chetty, Emmanuel Saez: w20290
We evaluate policies to increase prosocial behavior using a field experiment with 1,500 referees at the Journal of Public Economics. We randomly assign referees to four groups: a control group with a six week deadline to submit a referee report, a group with a four week deadline, a cash incentive group rewarded with $100 for meeting the four week deadline, and a social incentive group in which referees were told that their turnaround times would be publicly posted. We obtain four sets of results. First, shorter deadlines reduce the time referees take to submit reports substantially. Second, cash incentives significantly improve speed, especially in the week before the deadline. Cash payments do not crowd out intrinsic motivation: after the cash treatment ends, referees who received cash in...
Published: Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez & Laszlo Sandor, 2014. "What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 28(3), pages 169-88, Summer. citation courtesy of