Jaromir Nosal

Boston College
140 Commonwealth Avenue
322 Maloney Hall, Economics
Chestnut Hill, MA 02567

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

August 2017Credit Growth and the Financial Crisis: A New Narrative
with Stefania Albanesi, Giacomo De Giorgi: w23740
A broadly accepted view contends that the 2007-09 financial crisis in the U.S. was caused by an expansion in the supply of credit to subprime borrowers during the 2001- 2006 credit boom, leading to the spike in defaults and foreclosures that sparked the crisis. We use a large administrative panel of credit file data to examine the evolution of household debt and defaults between 1999 and 2013. Our findings suggest an alternative narrative that challenges the large role of subprime credit in the crisis. We show that credit growth between 2001 and 2007 was concentrated in the prime segment, and debt to high risk borrowers was virtually constant for all debt categories during this period. The rise in mortgage defaults during the crisis was concentrated in the middle of the credit score distri...
June 2014Investor Sophistication and Capital Income Inequality
with Marcin Kacperczyk, Luminita Stevens: w20246
What contributes to the growing income inequality across U.S. households? We develop an information- based general equilibrium model that links capital income derived from financial assets to a level of investor sophistication. Our model implies income inequality between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors that is growing in investors' aggregate and relative sophistication in the market. We show that our model is quantitatively consistent with the data from the U.S. market. In addition, we provide supporting evidence for our mechanism using a unique set of cross-sectional and time-series predictions on asset ownership and stock turnover.
February 2013Uncertainty as Commitment
with Guillermo Ordoñez: w18766
Time-inconsistency of no-bailout policies can create incentives for banks to take excessive risks and generate endogenous crises when the government cannot commit. However, at the outbreak of financial problems, usually the government is uncertain about their nature, and hence it may delay intervention to learn more about them. We show that intervention delay leads to strategic restraint banks endogenously restrict the riskiness of their portfolio relative to their peers in order to avoid being the worst performers and bearing the cost of such delay. These novel forces help to avoid endogenous crises even when the government cannot commit. We analyze the effect of government policies from the perspective of this new result.

Published: Nosal, Jaromir B. & Ordoñez, Guillermo, 2016. "Uncertainty as commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 124-140. citation courtesy of

June 2010The Nontradable Goods' Real Exchange Rate Puzzle
with Lukasz A. Drozd
in NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2009, Lucrezia Reichlin and Kenneth D. West, organizers
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