Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
Institutional Affiliation: University of Warwick
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2016||Cultural Differences and Institutional Integration|
with Luigi Guiso, Massimo Morelli
in NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2015, Michael B. Devereux, Francesco Giavazzi, and Kenneth D. West, editors
|September 2014||Turnout Across Democracies|
with Massimo Morelli, Salvatore Nunnari: w20451
World democracies widely differ in electoral rules, as well as in legislative, executive or legal institutions. Different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power. We explore how these mappings affect voters' participation to an election. We show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences for the competing parties. In particular, we uncover a novel contest effect: given the distribution of preferences, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of proportionality. Moreover, we generalize the competition effect, common to models of endogenous turnout...
Published: Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2016. "Turnout Across Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, , pages n/a-n/a. citation courtesy of
|July 2014||Political Booms, Financial Crises|
with Guillermo Ordoñez, Christoph Trebesch: w20346
We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism.