Department of Economics, Management
and Quantitative Methods (DEMM)
University of Milan
Via Conservatorio 7
Institutional Affiliation: University of Milan
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2019||Implicit and Explicit Commitment in Credit and Saving Contracts: A Field Experiment|
with , , , : w25802
We conduct a field experiment to test the demand for flexibility and for soft and hard commitment among clients of a microfinance institution. We offer a commitment contract inspired by the rotating structure of a ROSCA. Additional treatments test ex ante demand for soft commitment (in the form of reminders), hard commitment (in the form of a penalty for missing an installment), and flexibility (an option to postpone an installment). Our design is unique in the literature for allowing us to test — using the same respondent population — how demand for explicit commitment features differs between loan and savings contracts. We find substantial demand for both credit and savings contracts but no demand for additional commitment features — either in isolation or in combination — in spite of th...
|August 2018||Intrahousehold Consumption Allocation and Demand for Agency: A Triple Experimental Investigation|
with , , : w24977
We conduct two lab experiments and one field experiment to investigate demand for consumption agency in married couples. The evidence we uncover is consistent across all three experiments. Subjects are often no better at guessing their spouse's preferences than those of a stranger, and many subjects disregard what they believe or know about others' preferences when assigning them a consumption bundle. This confers instrumental value to individual executive agency within the household. We indeed find significant evidence of demand for agency in all three experiments, and this demand varies with the cost and anticipated instrumental benefit of agency. But subjects often make choices incompatible with pure instrumental motives – e.g., paying for agency even when they know their partner assign...