Emir Kamenica

University of Chicago
Booth School of Business
5807 S. Woodlawn Ave.
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773.834.8690

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NBER Working Papers and Publications

May 2013Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households
with Marianne Bertrand, Jessica Pan: w19023
We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We establish that gender identity - in particular, an aversion to the wife earning more than the husband - impacts marriage formation, the wife's labor force participation, the wife's income conditional on working, marriage satisfaction, likelihood of divorce, and the division of home production. The distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp cliff at 0.5, which suggests that a couple is less willing to match if her income exceeds his. Within marriage markets, when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man, marriage rates decline. Within couples, if the wife's potential income (based on her demographics) is likely to exceed the husband's,...

Published: Marianne Bertrand & Emir Kamenica & Jessica Pan, 2015. "Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(2), pages 571-614. citation courtesy of

January 2012Labor Supply of Politicians
with Raymond Fisman, Nikolaj A. Harmon, Inger Munk: w17726
We examine the labor supply of politicians using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). We exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries, which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Doubling an MEP's salary increases the probability of running for reelection by 23 percentage points and increases the logarithm of the number of parties that field a candidate by 29 percent of a standard deviation. A salary increase has no discernible impact on absenteeism or shirking from legislative sessions; in contrast, non-pecuniary motives, proxied by home-country corruption, substantially impact the intensive margin of labor supply. Finally, an increase in salary lowers the quality of elected MEPs, measured by the selectivity of their undergraduate institut...

Published: Raymond Fisman & Nikolaj A. Harmon & Emir Kamenica & Inger Munk, 2015. "LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 13(5), pages 871-905. citation courtesy of

September 2011Competition in Persuasion
with Matthew Gentzkow: w17436
We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.

Published: Matthew Gentzkow & Emir Kamenica, 2017. "Competition in Persuasion," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 84(1), pages 300-322.

November 2009Bayesian Persuasion
with Matthew Gentzkow: w15540
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results.

Published: “Bayesian Persuasion” (with Emir Kamenica). American Economic Review . 101(6). October 2011. citation courtesy of

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