Eduardo M. Azevedo
University of Pennsylvania
Wharton School, SHDH 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302
Institutional Affiliation: University of Pennsylvania
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|June 2018||Market Failure in Kidney Exchange|
with Nikhil Agarwal, Itai Ashlagi, Clayton R. Featherstone, Ömer Karaduman: w24775
We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from traditional market failures that can be fixed to increase transplants by 25%-55%. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals do not internalize their patients’ benefits from exchange, and current mechanisms sub-optimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we estimate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires a combined approach using new mechanisms and solving agency problems.
|September 2017||Strategy-proofness in the Large|
with Eric Budish: w23771
We propose a criterion of approximate incentive compatibility, strategy-proofness in the large (SP-L), and argue that it is a useful second-best to exact strategy-proofness (SP) for market design. Conceptually, SP-L requires that an agent who regards a mechanism’s “prices” as exogenous to her report – be they traditional prices as in an auction mechanism, or price-like statistics in an assignment or matching mechanism – has a dominant strategy to report truthfully. Mathematically, SP-L weakens SP in two ways: (i) truth-telling is required to be approximately optimal (within epsilon in a large enough market) rather than exactly optimal, and (ii) incentive compatibility is evaluated ex interim, with respect to all full-support i.i.d. probability distributions of play, rather than ex post wit...