Daniel G. Garrett
213 Social Siences
Durham, NC 27705
Institutional Affiliation: Duke University
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2019||Tax Policy and Local Labor Market Behavior|
with Eric C. Ohrn, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato: w25546
Since 2002, the US government has encouraged business investment using accelerated depreciation policies that significantly reduce investment costs. We provide the first in-depth analysis of this stimulus on employment and earnings. Our local labor markets approach exploits cross-industry differences in policy generosity interacted with county-level variation in industry concentration. Places that experience larger decreases in investment costs see a level increase in employment that implies a $53,000 cost-per-job. We find no positive effects on average earnings. In contrast, we document a persistent growth in capital. These results imply a capital-labor substitution elasticity that grows over time and can exceed unity.
Published: Daniel G. Garrett & Eric Ohrn & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2020. "Tax Policy and Local Labor Market Behavior," American Economic Review: Insights, vol 2(1), pages 83-100.
|January 2019||How Elastic is the Demand for Tax Havens? Evidence from the US Possessions Corporations Tax Credit|
with Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato: w25516
Why do some firms adopt certain tax havens and how sensitive is the demand for tax havens? We address these questions by studying how the repeal of Section 936 tax credits affected firms with affiliates in Puerto Rico. We first describe the characteristics of US multinationals that were exposed to Section 936. We then show that the market value of exposed firms decreased after losing access to Section 936, implying that firms could not perfectly substitute to other tax havens. Finally, we find that firms exposed to Section 936 did not respond by expanding their network of tax havens.
Published: Daniel Garrett & Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato, 2019. "How Elastic is the Demand for Tax Havens? Evidence from the US Possessions Corporations Tax Credit," AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 109, pages 493-499. citation courtesy of
|June 2017||Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for Municipal Bonds|
with Andrey Ordin, James W. Roberts, Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato: w23473
We study the interaction between tax advantages for municipal bonds and the market structure of auctions for these bonds. We show this interaction can limit the ability of bidders to extract information rents and is a crucial determinant of state and local governments' borrowing costs. Reduced-form estimates show that increasing the tax advantage by 3 pp. lowers mean borrowing costs by 9-10%, consistent with a greater-than-unity passthrough elasticity. We estimate a structural auction model to measure markups, and to illustrate and quantify how the interaction between tax policy and bidder strategic behavior leads to large passthrough elasticities. We use the estimated model to evaluate the efficiency of Obama and Trump administration policies that limit the tax advantage for municipal bon...