National Institute of Statistics
and Economic Studies
Direction des Études et
15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
92244 Malakoff Cedex, France
Institutional Affiliations: SESSI and CREST
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|August 2015||The Gains from Input Trade in Firm-Based Models of Importing|
with Joaquin Blaum, Michael Peters: w21504
Trade in intermediate inputs allows firms to lower their costs of production by using better, cheaper, or novel inputs from abroad. Quantifying the aggregate impact of input trade, however, is challenging. As importing firms differ markedly in how much they buy in foreign markets, results based on aggregate models do not apply. We develop a methodology to quantify the gains from input trade for a class of firm-based models of importing. We derive a sufficiency result: the change in consumer prices induced by input trade is fully determined from the joint distribution of value added and domestic expenditure shares in material spending across firms. We provide a simple formula that can be readily evaluated given the micro-data. In an application to French data, we find that consumer prices o...
|February 2013||Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France|
with Luis Garicano, John Van Reenen: w18841
We show how size-contingent laws can be used to identify the equilibrium and welfare effects of labor regulation. Our framework incorporates such regulations into the Lucas (1978) model and applies this to France where many labor laws start to bind on firms with exactly 50 or more employees. Using data on the population of firms between 2002 and 2007 period, we structurally estimate the key parameters of our model to construct counterfactual size, productivity and welfare distributions. With flexible wages, the deadweight loss of the regulation is below 1% of GDP, but when wages are downwardly rigid welfare losses exceed 5%. We also show, regardless of wage flexibility, that the main losers from the regulation are workers (and to a lesser extent large firms) and the main winners are small ...
Published: Luis Garicano & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, 2016. "Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3439-3479, November. citation courtesy of
|May 2010||Entrepreneurship and Credit Constraints: Evidence from a French Loan Guarantee Program|
with David Sraer, David Thesmar
in International Differences in Entrepreneurship, Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar, editors
|May 2006||Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm|
with Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen, Fabrizio Zilibotti: w12206
This paper develops a framework to analyze the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization decisions of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. However, the manager can use her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the trade-off shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three datasets of French and British firms in the 1990s we report robust correlations consistent with these predic...
Published: Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1759-1799, November. citation courtesy of