Alexandros P. Vardoulakis
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Institutional Affiliation: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2020||Optimal Bank Regulation In the Presence of Credit and Run-Risk|
with Anil K. Kashyap, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos: w26689
We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model so that, besides offering liquidity services to depositors, banks also raise equity funding, make loans that are risky, and can invest in safe, liquid assets. The bank and its borrowers are subject to limited liability. When profitable, banks monitor borrowers to ensure that they repay loans. Depositors may choose to run based on conjectures about the resources that are available for people withdrawing early and beliefs about banks’ monitoring. We use a new type of global game to solve for the run decision. We find that banks opt for a more deposit-intensive capital structure than a social planner would choose. The privately chosen asset portfolio can be more or less lending-intensive, while the scale of intermediation can also be higher or low...
|May 2014||How does macroprudential regulation change bank credit supply?|
with Anil K. Kashyap, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos: w20165
We analyze a variant of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking in which savers can use a bank to invest in a risky project operated by an entrepreneur. The savers can buy equity in the bank and save via deposits. The bank chooses to invest in a safe asset or to fund the entrepreneur. The bank and the entrepreneur face limited liability and there is a probability of a run which is governed by the bank's leverage and its mix of safe and risky assets. The possibility of the run reduces the incentive to lend and take risk, while limited liability pushes for excessive lending and risk-taking. We explore how capital regulation, liquidity regulation, deposit insurance, loan to value limits, and dividend taxes interact to offset these frictions. We compare agents welfare in the decentralized e...
|March 2012||Financial Regulation in General Equilibrium|
with Charles A.E. Goodhart, Anil K. Kashyap, Dimitrios P. Tsomocos: w17909
This paper explores how different types of financial regulation could combat many of the phenomena that were observed in the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. The primary contribution is the introduction of a model that includes both a banking system and a "shadow banking system" that each help households finance their expenditures. Households sometimes choose to default on their loans, and when they do this triggers forced selling by the shadow banks. Because the forced selling comes when net worth of potential buyers is low, the ensuing price dynamics can be described as a fire sale. The proposed framework can assess five different policy options that officials have advocated for combating defaults, credit crunches and fire sales, namely: limits on loan to value ratios, capital requireme...